BACKGROUND
The national policy for employing Reserve forces in support of National Military Strategy changed in the 70s when senior leaders decided to assign greater responsibility for the nation's security to U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and the National Guard. 1 was asked in the questionnaire pertaining to applications of the Laird-Abrams Doctrine: "Is the Laird-Abrams doctrine being applied as intended?" Out of the nine general officers that participated in the questionnaire, eight concurred with the current use of the doctrine, some with considerable reservation. They afford the following comments.
• America must use its Armed forces with the support of its citizens. It is the only option that achieves the end.
• The Laird-Abrams Doctrine was designed to stop the United States from engaging in a war (Vietnam) without involving the public (political expectation). It has been effective.
• Using Reserve Component to fight terrorism has taken it to the extreme!!!
• The "Citizen Soldier" is actively engaged to the point of being "over tasked."
• The Laird-Abram Doctrine is currently being used as intended -however, there appears to be an attempt to dilute it with a rebalancing initiative.
• We are at war and the United States Army Reserve should be an important part of the effort.
• The Army Reserve has been over-extended because the "demand seemed to be exceeding the supply." We should not eliminate the use of the Reserve Component; just refine how it is used, so we can sustain what we're doing.
The questionnaire then posed a related question: "What is the long-term implication of the increased operational tempo on the Army Reserve personnel." The majority of generals believed that in the longer term (two to five years) the increased operational tempo would impact retention and recruitment. Listed below are some of their comments:
• Reservists joined the Reserve for a variety of reasons, but they did not join to be part of a full-time Army. They joined to be called for "in case of" war, not to be re-called on a regular basis.
• I would expect to see these effects 2-3 years. Hence, we have in effect changed the "contract" with the Reserve personnel when we started to actively plan to rotationally mobilize every 5 years to a "hot" area...
• When we get to the 3rd and 4th iteration of mobilizations, the Reserve forces will be tapped out. A lot of soldiers will be "off tours", less than 5 years.
• The major impact on personnel readiness: Available soldiers i.e. retention, recruiting, and support issues. The Army Reserve funding needs to increase to hire more fulltime manning Active Guard Reserve & Department of the Army Civilians and Military Technicians. I expect employer support to wane -this will have impact on retention.
• Not the same since 9/11 -affecting families and employers. It will change the method of training, mobilization and other process due to the increased operational tempo.
• In general, employers were in support of round 1, but they are asking questions about "how much more."
• If operational tempo continues, it may impact on people's willingness to serve and hurt recruiting.
• Hopefully, the increased operational tempo should increase USAR readiness… Not sure how it could not, like any other profession where significant increase in training and operations takes place. It "re-greens" the Army Reserve .
Military peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and humanitarian operations increased throughout the 90's, so Reservists mobilized and deployed more frequently. 6 As a result, the With the increase in deployments, the majority of the results from the questionnaire revealed that most participants felt that the Army Reserve was not presently over-tasked.
Nevertheless, effective use of the Army Reserve was in question, as reflected in the following comments.
• One-third of the USAR is mobilized today and I see little relief in the future. Therefore, while the USAR is almost "at war," the country is not. This is a long-term problem.
• No, it is not being effectively used. The Reserve component (RC) has to be consulted and trusted by the Active component (AC) for the system to work better. USAF and USMC models for employment of the reserve work better than Army model. • It is over-tasked as a Reserve force. USAR is now a fulltime 2 nd job versus a 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks a year job.
• It is not too bad now, but we can't sustain.
• Either over tasked, or under resourced (end strength). To remain relevant the USAR needs to be tasked, however we appear to turn our 20 Citizen-soldiers are asking whether the new rotation policy will reduce the frequency of deployments. According to Secretary Rumsfeld and General Meyers, revision of the previous deployment process was needed to ease the impact of personnel mobilizing. So a primary purpose of the rotation policy was to provide predictability and stability to the Armed forces. The new plan thus provides advance notification for active and reserve components.
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At a minimum, all reserve personnel will receive 30 days or longer notification prior to mobilization. This will give service members time to get their affairs in order prior to deployment. This plan will also ensure Reserve personnel are not frequently mobilized. Only have mobilized in the past six years. Also the number of boots on the ground in Iraq will decline from 130,000 to 105,000. • The majority agreed that a fully integrated rotation policy for the Army Reserve is needed to reduce the burden on frequently mobilized units/personnel in the Army
Reserve.
• Collectively they cited key issues in the new Rotation policy: provide stability and predictability to the Reservists.
• They noted that Reservists did not sign-up to be part of the active force on a regular basis.
• Several generals concurred with one respondent's assertion: "We have effectively changed the contract with the Reserve soldier by going to a Rotation Policy."
ANALYSIS THE CURRENT SITUATION
The drastic post-Vietnam reduction of the armed forces and the significant increase of contingencies and peacekeeping operations have resulted in an increase of operational tempo for mobilized Army Reserve personnel in support of the National Strategy. These frequent and extended deployments are having a significant impact on Reservists' morale. They are also creating a public outcry, not only from family members and employers, but from their congressional representatives. If operational tempo continues at the current pace, the USARC's readiness will decline in the future through retention and recruitment shortfalls. There are several factors that would make this Course of Action difficult to execute.
Currently, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers do not support an increase in troop endstrength. 29 They believe that there are other alternatives that Army senior leadership and DOD needs to address before increasing the size of the Army. Some of these alternatives that Secretary Rumsfeld addressed are as follows: 1) DOD needs to eliminate some of its on-going peacekeeping operations. 2) DOD could employ over 300,000 civilians to fill non-combat service support positions that are currently being filled by military personnel. They will perform security functions at installations and some peacekeeping duties. 3) Finally, the Army senior leadership needs to assess alignments of current forces to determine ways to improve its organizational efficiency.
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Increasing the Army's end-strength will not provide immediate relief to the Reserve's frequent deployments; however, it should provide some long-term relief. During an interview with ABC's Good Morning America, one frustrated Reserve sergeant, expressed his concerns Operation Iraqi Freedom will only intensify future recruiting problems.
COURSE OF ACTION 2 -A FULLY INTEGRATED ROTATION POLICY
This COA action supports the USARC's FRRI. The USARC should establish a policy that prohibits any unit or personnel from mobilizing more than one time within five years, unless they volunteer. Such a change in the mobilization policy would provide reassurance of stabilization and predictability, thus reducing family stress from frequent separations. Likewise, employers would probably support citizen-soldier more during and after deployments. This course of action also accounts for peacekeeping operations that have prompted frequent Reserve deployments during the past twelve years. Under this plan, Reserve soldiers know they will be called to serve during major conflicts.
There are several shortfalls associated with this COA. First, the USARC must restructure its force based on the current capabilities in the reserve. We have noted that Reserve owns 70 percent of support capabilities and up to 93 to 100 percent of the total Army capability in several specialties. 35 So this plan would require the Army Reserve to convert a few of its less deployable units to frequently deployed units. This plan could also jeopardize readiness. It is difficult to find applicants that qualify, especially in the chemical and civil affairs fields. Because these units are so specialized, less is better for overall readiness. Only a small pool of the recruitment population will qualify for these military specialties. Maintaining these types of units at a high personnel readiness level is a challenge.
COURSE OF ACTION 3 -EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY RESERVE IN SUPPORT OF MAJOR CONFLICTS AND WARS
Change the current National Security policy so that the Army Reserve would be deployed 
RECOMMENDATION
Implement the Fully Integrated Rotation Plan, which requires hiring 300,000 civilian contractors to provide some short and long-term relief. Additionally, the Active and Reserve must change their current mix to reduce the burden placed on the Army Reserve personnel in high demand specialties. The Army Reserve must change its current structure by converting some of its low demand units into high demand units to relieve some of the burden placed on its own personnel. DOD must increase resources to fund more Reserve units at higher authorized organization levels, especially high demand units.
CONCLUSION
The majority of the general officers that participated in the questionnaire reported that the of 300,000 civilians to fill some of the non-combat jobs that are currently being done by military personnel and the reduction of a few long-standing peace-keeping operations will provide quick relief. 36 Then, the Army Reserve and the Active Component will have more personnel to place in the rotation pool, thereby, reducing the current demands on Reserve and Active personnel.
Some claim that the Reservists signed up for their current duties, but that is not entirely true. Most Reservists signed up to defend their country in the time of war or major crisis. They did not sign up to be policemen. If these issues of frequent and extended deployments are not addressed, we may not be able to depend on an all-volunteer Army to support our national security. We may indeed become a nation at risk.
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